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The Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts in Egypt. By Erwin
R. Goodenough. A reply to the review by Max Radin in the
June, 1930, issue of the YALE LAW JOURNAL.
A Ravmw of my The Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts in Egypt in the
June number of this Journal really demands an answer, not in defense of
the book itself, for that must stand on its own feet, but to meet the serious
charge of scholarly irresponsibility. It is the function of the reviewer,
while evaluating the book he is discussing, to point out as many as he can
of the inevitable errors in any work of great detail. Mr. Radin has gone
beyond this, and, having, as he supposes, caught me in the very act of
loose scholarship, would slay me utterly. Under the circumstances, before
succumbing, I feel that there are a few things which ought to be said about
the first stone.
First, a word in general about the book in question. A historian of
ancient philosophy and religion by profession, I ran into material in a
scriptural commentary written by Philo the Jewish philosopher of Alexan-
dria in the days of the early Empire, material which lawyers never read,
yet which seemed to me full of highly interesting statements about law
which frequently could only reflect actual practices in Jewish-Alexandrian
courts at the time. So, without ever having had any legal training, I
plunged into the difficult task of extracting this practical law from its
setting by using a comparative study of Roman, Greek, Alexandrian, Jewish,
and occasionally Egyptian, jurisprudence. That I would make a good
many mistakes in such a daring undertaking, however cautious I was, I
knew to be inevitable, but I was willing to risk that in the hope of proving to
lawyers my main thesis, namely that Phio really was an important source
for legal history in the period. All this I stated plainly enough in my
Preface.
Now I am proud to say that one of my first converts is Mr. Radin him-
self. He admits that 'by a cautious weighing of this (Philonic] material
we may gain a great deal" of the practical law of Alexandrian Jewry, a
statement contradicted by all scholars before my book appeared. I have
struck a "scarcely used quarry" for legal history. But that he learned
about this from me the reader of his review would hardly suspect.
Instead I am charged on two counts: of having attempted to prove an
erroneous thesis, and of having conducted my investigations without regard
for accuracy.
Since Mr. Radin is determined to quarrel with my main thesis although
he has already been converted to it, he must represent me as purposing to
prove something I do not purpose. So he describes me as having set out to
show "that Philo consciously presents to us the specific legal system actually
in operation in the courts of the Jewish politeuma." Nothing could have
been further from my thoughts or statements. What I do say is that "I
dare assign practical value to the laws described in this treatise (the Do
Specialibus Legibus) ;" "Here is law in a place where lawyers never tread."
But that here is a consciously presented "specific legal system" I never
say or suggest. The pages of Philo as they were analysed yielded laws only
in shreds and tatters. When these detailed bits from Philo are arranged
and put together, if the result seems to me to give a more complete knowl-
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edge of their jurisprudence than we have from most such isolated legal
systems of the day, that is far indeed from saying that I consider Philo
to be consciously setting forth that system as a system.
Worse than the fallacy of this fancied thesis of mine, Mr. Radin finds
my lack of the "Roman exacta diligentia in finding authority for my state-
ments." To do justice to his criticisms I must speak of them -criatim.
He says correctly that I call the strategos the Roman executive, and
goes on to say that in Egypt "the Roman executive was the prefect," and
that the strategos was a subordinate official, frequently not a Roman at all
The only question to be settled here is whether the prefect was the only man
in Egypt to whom we may apply the word executive. The strategoi (Philo
too refers to them in the plural) are correctly to be described as those local
executives representing the power of Rome so abundantly familiar from the
papyri. Whether their personal nationality was Greek or Roman does not
affect the fact that as local executives they represented Roman authority.
That the strategos in Egypt was the prefect I nowhere state or imply. My
statements would perhaps be clearer if I had qualified my "Roman e-xecu-
tive" with the word "local," but seemed to me plain to anyone who under-
stood the terminology of the period.
Mr. Radin's next criticism is peculiarly confused. He says that I "refer
to a prohibition by Tiberius 'in 11 A.D.' against 'recourse to magicians
whether privately or in the presence of witnesses. The date was 16 A.D.
and the passage of Suetonius (Tib. 63) to which he refers (n. 29) speaks
only of haruspices and forbids only secret consultation." This is a mixture
of justifiable criticism, error, and misrepresentation. He is right that the
law applied to haruspices, and I was of course in error in speaking of
Tiberius. as making a law in 11 A.D. But there were actually two laws,
one late in Augustus' reign, usually dated about 11 A.D., and the later law
of Tiberius which he has correctly summarized. The law of which I was
speaking was the earlier law, and the reference to Dio Cassius (LVI, 25)
which I gave for it in the same footnote with the Suetonius reference, but
which Mr. Radin is pleased to ignore, forbade specifically consultation
"when others are present."
Again Mr. Radin says that I have misrepresented Heinemann as being
in error when I quote him as saying that "the Attic drachma was worth
four times the shekel." As a matter of fact I say nothing of the kind, but
that Heinemann was in error in his statement that "the Alexandrian
drachma was worth double the Attic drachma" (p. 45), which incorrect
statement he clearly makes at the passage to which I refer.
He says that in asserting that Phio regarded Gentile slaves as "truly
slaves" I am not justified by my reference in Phio. But as I have shown
(p. 52), such a distinction was axiomatic among Jews at the time, and
since we know it from other sources, seems reflcctcd in Philo's distinguish-
ing slaves on the basis of the fundamental difference between oikcioi and
allot rio Such is at least a legitimate interpretation of his words.
Mr. Radin says that I assume that the Greeks would be ignorant of any
sort of asylum but an altar. This quite misrepresents what I say on p. 41,
and as to my making any such assumption in general I can only refer him
to p. 54, where I mention the various sorts of refuge for fugitives, "whether
to any holy place or to legally recognized asylums." The right of asylum
of slaves in Alexandria which Philo reflects was not, of course, based upon
Roman law, but upon the Greek law observed in Ptolemaic times in Alex-
andria, as I have shown. Mr. Radin's argument that it appeared in Roman
law later is, then, quite irrelevant to my contention that Phio's law cor-
responded to the traditional practice in Alexandria.
Mr. Radin has caught me in my parenthetic statement that classic
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Greek law allowed the eldest son a double portion in the inheritance;
actually the eldest had only an undefined "preferential treatment." My
point, made clear by evidence published and forthcoming to which I refer,
is that such a double portion had long been allowed the eldest son by the
Greek law of Alexandria, and that Philo's interpretation of Scripture seems
affected thereby. Mr. Radin's assertion that such a law was "early"
observed by Jews, and is the general rule taken as axiomatic in the Talmud
is very interesting if it can be substantiated from Talmudic sources to
have been "the accepted Jewish understanding of the passage in Deuter-
onomy" as early as the time of Philo, developed independently of Gentile
influence. If Mr. Radin can prove it, I would be very glad to modify my
statements on this detail; but I suspect that he can not do so.
My reviewer has again Properly corrected me in distinguishing between
the fact that a dowry became not the possession of the husband, but only
that he had permanent and undisputed enjoyment of the usufruct of it,
although my argument is quite unaffected by the correction of the verbal
infelicity in re "possessions." As to my claiming the support of Heine-
mann for what I say of the treatment of a minor girl by her elder brothers
in case of settling the father's estate, Mr. Radin has read the wrong foot-
note in Heinemann. He should have seen p. 141, n. 4, not p. 140, n. 6 to
which he thinks I refer.
Again Mr. Radin says: "He cites the Lex Cornelia as authority for the
penalty for false witness but the passages he mentions (p. 179, n. 92)
refer to the forging of wills." Mr. Radin, although he criticizes them,
could not have checked my references, for I will quote only one of those
I gave, Ulpian, ap. Dig. XLVIII, x, 9, 3: "Poena legis Corneliae irrogatur
ei, qui quid aliud, quam in testamento, sciens dole male falsum signaverit
siguarive curaverit; item qui falsas testationes faciendas testimoniave falsa
invicem dicenda dolo malo coierint."
"It is hardly worth while to speculate on a 'Greek source' for 'Ulpian's
law' (p. 181), when Ulpian specifically says . . . that he is citing a rescript
of Severus and Caracalla." Mr. Radin is making a verbal quibble. What
I am doing in my text is to suggest that Romans took over, in a law which
Ulpian has preserved, the Hellenistic legal protection of the horkos basilikos.
The imperial rescript would properly be called Ulpian's source, but the law
as it stands seems to me clearly to reflect a Greek original, since we know
this very similar Greek law, and because the Roman law preserved and pre-
scribed an old whipping formula which the officer was to recite as he
scourged the offender, which formula in the Latin text is given in Greek.
Just what the connection was we have no data to establish.
Mr. Radin points out correctly that the capital penalty for kidnapping
was introduced too late for me to use it. But from his general remarks
and his reference I should judge that he is himself "doubtless not aware"
that the decree of Diocletian and Maximian of 287 first changing the penalty
is still extant in Cod. IX, xx, 7.
Finally as to whether an extra-legal popular execution is to be called
"lynching" or "wild justice, folk justice," and whether it becomes legal
when practised contrary to formal law as a part of local customs is a point
which I must leave to professional casuists. I used the term "lynch" because
it is so vivid, and because it was applied to precisely this kind of Jewish
execution under Roman rule by the very great legal authority in the field,
Juster. The fact is that though the Romans formally reserved the ius
gladii, which meant the right to inflict capital penalty, they seem practically
to have winked at a good deal of execution by local groups, so long as it
did not threaten Roman citizens or the public peace. As to the term prop-
erly to be applied to this type of execution, I suspect that if "lynching" is
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too strong the practice is really what Aristotle would have called anonynos.
That is, Mr. Radin's corrections, while some of them are valid, are on
the whole confused and misleading. But the most misleading feature of
all is that were he right in every detail he has mentioned, he would not lead
the reader to suspect that my argument, and the great mass of my evidence,
would thereby be totally unaffected. He closes his review by saying that,
since I have made all the errors he fancies he has pointed out, I have not
taken my responsibilities in scholarship as seriously as they deserved; I
have not examined my statements closely enough. That I could have
written a book in this quite strange field, a book that could pass through the
hands of a critic so determined to find errors that he will misrepresent me
to get material for criticism, and yet have to admit so few matters of detail
actually in error, has quite passed my hopes. There will surely be other
errors which Mr. Radin has not detected, and which later reviewers will
point out. But in the matter of scholarly accuracy about which Mr. Radin
speaks, his review can hardly be regarded as a model.
New Haven, Conn. ERwiN RI. GOODENOUGH.
A Treatise on Commercial Arbitration and Awards. By Wesley
A. Sturges. Kansas City, Vernon Law Book Co., 1930. pp.
x, 1082.
THmR is irony in the fate of one who takes precautions to avoid litigation
by submitting to arbitration, and who, as a reward for his pains, finds
himself eventually in court fighting not on the merits of his case but on the
merits of the arbitration. And when we mass hundreds of thousands of
situations in which the courts have passed on arbitrations, as Professor
Sturges masses them in his new book, unless we lose all sense of realism
the total result is a monumental tragi-comedy. In the even-toned scholar-
ship of the author who laboriously masses case on case and links statute
to statute, there is no indication that he is aware either of the tragedy
of the law thwarting legitimate efforts to escape its tortuous procedure or
the comedy of a party jumping from the frying pan of litigation on a
substantive matter into the fire of litigation on adjective law. Yet his
writings in the periodicals clearly indicate that he realizes the significance
to business of a reasonable system of arbitration not only approved but
actively supported by the law., The book before us is a law book of the
orthodox type, a first aid to the lawyer who is called upon to attack or
defend an award, and to be judged as such rather than, as the author hopes,
as "a guide for parties, for their attorneys, and for arbitrators in con-
ducting an arbitration."
It is no criticism of the author, but merely a record of the historical
attitude of our courts, to note that this faithful transcription of the law
of arbitration as it is, bristles with "don'ts" and contains very little sug-
gestion or help of a positive nature. The law has limited the subjects of
arbitration. Three chapters here are devoted to the struggle for the in-
clusion of future disputes under an existing contract, and half of another
to the exclusion of real estate, probate, divorce, and related matters.
Likewise, the law has limited the enforceability, and in general insisted on
the revocability, of agreements to arbitrate. It has scrutinized parties more
carefully than in ordinary contractual matters. It has made submission to
arbitration a precariously technical matter, and has thrown out arbitrations
because of slips in the choice of arbitrators or in preliminary procedure
as well as in the actual hearings and framing of awards. Several chapters
ISee BLoomFIELD, SELECTED ARTICLES ON COMMERCLL AIBITILTION
(1927) 156; (1926) 9 J. A.M. JuD. Soc. 81.
1930]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
are devoted to procedure and causes for defeating or correcting awards in
courts. Even the more hopeful topics, such as those dealing with the
enforcement of awards, are hopeful, when examined in detail, only under
a few liberal statutes. In general, an award is neither a judgment nor
the direct basis for one. Obviously, whatever anay be said of the liberal
attitude of lawyers in the reception of arbitration,2 the law has proved a
jealous mistress. It has submitted even new legislation to strict interpre-
tation by drawing a sharp distinction between statutory arbitration and
common law arbitration and by refusing to extend to the latter any of the
advantages provided for the former,
The materials assembled by Professor Sturges are, accordingly, highly
technical. They deal with abstract concepts rather than things, with pro-
cedure rather than substantive rights, with pitfalls for which the layman
might consider arbitration the last place to look. He has brought these
materials together under an outline characterized by a simplicity and
obviousness that is the result of careful analysis. Externally it is the
chronological order of procedure in a case: the agreement to arbitrate, the
submission to arbitration, the preliminary procedure, the hearing, the
award, its enforcement or overthrow. Simple as this essential outline may
seem, in order to carry it through at all it has been necessary at every
step to take cognizance of the common law, the statutes, and the case law
interpreting the statutes in practically every jurisdiction in the United
States. The author has not only succeeded in reducing all of this material
to his outline with remarkably little repetition, but he has given in every
case a good composite picture of the various aspects of arbitration in the
United States in 1930.
The date is important, for it has been less than a decade since the first
modern statute of arbitration was passed in New York (1921). New Jersey
(1923), Massachusetts, Oregon, and the federal government (1925) fol-
lowed. The Uniform Arbitration Act was first presented in 1924 and has
since been adopted with minor modifications in Nevada, North Carolina,
Idaho, and Wyoming. In the same period other states have made one or
more of the concessions contained in these acts. We thus have less than
ten years of experience with agreements to arbitrate that are valid, en-
forceable and irrevocable, that call for substantial cooperation of courts
in such matters as advising on questions of law, or filling vacancies in the
panel of arbitrators, or summoning witnesses to attend, or furnishing
provisional and ancillary remedies, or recording awards as judgments ready
for enforcement. To illustrate the implications that are still to be worked
out as a result of some of these departures from tradition, we may turn to
the novel subject matter in Professor Sturges' final chapter dealing with
the conflict of laws. So long as the common law was fairly uniform as well
as grudging in its attitude towards arbitration, there was little occasion
to pass on the diversities of arbitration law. Even with these laws, so long
as the award was merely the equivalent of a contract, the rules of the
conflict of laws related to contract could be made to suffice for arbitra-
tion. But with the award given the rank of a judgment a new question
arises as to the respect to be accorded to it in other jurisdictions. There is,
furthermore, a series of problems connected with the choice of jurisdictions
by the parties when they stipulate the state in accordance with whose laws
they agree to arbitrate. In a word, this is perhaps the earliest stage at
which a satisfactory textbook could have been written of arbitration taking
cognizance of statutory developments. Though it is not the first substantial
law book on arbitration and awards, it is still a pionepr work. Much of
it is laboriously built up around uninterpreted statutory texts after the
2 Preface, p. 3.
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fashion of the first books on the bankruptcy law, the first books on income
tax, the first books on interstate commerce, workmen's compensation, and
other statutory innovations. But the work is done on the basis of so
thorough a study of common law arbitration and this is so minutely com-
pared with statutory innovations, that there can be no doubt of its useful-
ness or well-merited influence at this crucial stage in the history of Amer-
ican commercial arbitration that lies ahead of us.
Cambridge, Mass. NATHAN ISAACS.
The Case Method of Studying Law. By Jacob Hem- Landman.
New York, G. A. Jennings Co., 1930. pp. 108. $2.
T E case method of law teaching has been so successful, judged by practical
results, that for many years after the battle against text-book instruction
had been won -law teachers were uncritical of their pedagogical methods.
Recently, however, the feeling has been growing that the case method,
too, as it was actually employed with large classes, left much to be desired.
The increasingly critical attitude of -law teachers toward current teaching
is perhaps the most encouraging thing in legal education today. In this
volume we have an examination of law teaching made by an author having
legal training but by profession a college teacher. As Dean Sommers says
in his introduction, the book might well have been entitled "A College
Teacher Looks at Law Training." The author's general thesis is about as
follows: Law training should be scientific; the case method is not scientific;
but the problem method advocated by the author is; furthermore it affords
opportunity to enrich the legal data with pertinent social and economic
facts.
As indicating a process of development of the writer and perhaps others,
the book is interesting and stimulating. It should also have the effect of
arousing any law teachers who have not been affected by the newer critical
attitude in law. Beyond this the appeal of the book is limited. Its pros-
pective audience is obviously the law professor and it does not purport to
be a general expository statement of legal education. It is an argument,
and one that for the most part overlooks the attempts at improvement of
method which are now being made. In fact the author seems largely un-
familiar with much of modern legal education. Perhaps the most effective
part of the book is its criticism of the case method. This is weakened,
however, by an apparent lack of appreciation of the part administrative
matters, such as the size of the class, play in rendering the case method
ineffective.
The author's suggested solution, like all simple solutions of somewhat
difficult problems, seems naive. Law schools today employ the problem
method in law review work, in moot court briefs, in individual student re-
search and even to a considerable extent in the modern casebooks. In
reality case method and project method are likely to become rather closely
assimilated in practice, and either may be comparatively ineffective in result.
One may suggest that more important than the name of the method used or
the attempt to make it conform to something after all very considerably dif-
ferent-experiment in the physical sciences-is the relation of the size of the
student body to the size of the faculty and the general physical equipment
of the school. In classes of two to four hundred per instructor the problem
method would surely break down even more than the case method; while
in small classes resort is made naturally to the problem method.
The author's argument for the use of social as well as legal data in the
decision of law cases will, I think, appeal to most law teachers at the
present day. But the process is actually slow and difficult. Here, too,
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administrative difficulties have an importance which Professor Landman
has not indicated. Nevertheless, exhortation is probably useful to reassure
the doubters.
New Haven, Conn. CHARLES E. CLARK.
The Growth and Decadence of Constitutional Government. By
J. Allen Smith. New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1930. pp.
xvii, 300. $3.
THE appearance of a book by the late J. Allen Smith offers a belated
opportunity to recognize his unique work. In 1907 his Spirit of tho
American Government failed to win from bewildered reviewers the repute
it deserved. Another chance at recognition did not come, for Growth and
Decadence of Constitutional Government was still in manuscript at his
death. He was primarily a teacher; the best of his efforts went into
blazing new trails in the class-room; only two unpretentious volumes remain
to bear evidence to the quality of a sincere, daring, and original mind.
Between the dates of the two studies -lies more than two decades of intel-
lectual history. During this period the ways of American government have
been among the most significant of inquiries; and Smith was the pioneer
in seeking a realistic understanding of the constitution.
A knowledge of the state of inquiry at the time is essential to an ap-
preciation of his distinctive contribution. In 1907 the study of the
constitution had hardly been touched by the current intellectual awakening.
In halls of learning the document was a great text, interpreted by courts,
and inviting the exegesis of scholars; out of clause and phrase, as circum.
stance demanded, was to be drawn the meaning packed away there by the
founding fathers; the rules, precepts, principles were to be arranged into
a neat, orderly, consistent, and "logical" system. Only "the analytical"
and "the historical" methods invited dispute. The analyst went through
his materials, following his outline point by point; the historian set down
his propositions in the order of their discovery. But alike they approached
static doctrine by the way of dialectic; they differed in being alternative
ways towards the same truths. In public opinion, for all the outcry against
officials and parties, there was a fundamentalist belief in the perfection
of our system of government-in-the-abstract. In particular the constitution
and its interpretation were inspired; its goodness was a matter of faith,
and its operation was beyond curious inquiry. In the study of the document
there was play for the intellect in neat arrangement, in the sequence of
reasons, in deft distinctions and reconciliations, in subtle little problems of
logomachy. But, as for the great adventure of the mind, constitutional
government was formal and devout and lifeless and dull.
It was into such a world of scholarship that Smith's American Govern-
ment -came. There had been exaggerated protest and timid suggestion
before, but his was the first restrained and scholarly study to replace
abstract dogma with vital questions. He asked how the constitution had
come into existence, who were the men that had framed it, what was the
stuff in idea and institution of which it was compounded, and what
specifically it was intended by its authors to accomplish. He made much
of the change which had come over the country, of the transition from
frontier farming to big business, the replacement of the individual by the
corporation, the separation of the population into industrial groups, and
the connection between vested interests and political control. le ventured
to inquire how an instrument of government contrived by an eighteenth




The book was vital rather than popular. A second edition was never
printed; but it came as a breath of frdsh air to youths just out of training
who had sold themselves to academic work in constitutional government
and politics. It was, as a product of its day, marked by the evangelical
zeal that led on to "the great crusade" of 1912 for political and economic
reform. But the young in learning found something far more lasting.
They wanted the zest of finding out, not the comfortable assurance of
fundamental principles and eternal verities; and Smith's book offered just
that. In intellectual work the question-the live, significant, penetrating
question-is the thing. Only the mind blessed with the creative flash can
inquire freshly, sharply, and to the point; but, once the question is set,
less original inquirers can fare forth for answers. It was Smith's work,
in many fertile ways, to merge speculation with fact, and to ask how and
why of the current operation of constitutional government.
The significance of the book is revealed by what came in its wake.
A whole generation of students, responding to his and kindred influences,
have cultivated where Smith pioneered. In direct succession stands Charles
A. Beard's An Econwnnic Interpretatiot of the Constitution and Origi=s of
Jeffersonian Denocracy. Max Farrand's Framing of the Constiution is
alike a corrective of Beard and a brilliant example of realism in constitu-
tional inquiry. Arthur T. Hadley's memorable essay, The Constitutional
Position of Property in Avwrca, has made clear a "division of powers"
between the rights of persons and of ownership in the fundamental law.
Edward S. Corwin has shown how a constitutional doctrine has a life his-
tory; Felix Frankfurter, how decisions may rest upon the fortuitous char-
acter of procedure; and Thomas Reed Powell, how justices behave like
human beings. Howard Lee McBain has written persuasively--and even
convincingly-in behalf of The Living Constitutiom Studies such as these
derive from many sources; even without Smith's contribution, there was
far too much intellectual ferment in kindred disciplines for them to have
been long delayed. But their rich and novel content, as well as their
kinship in spirit, bears testimony to the importance of his Arwrican
Government.
And it is this imposing array of important contributions which robs
Constitutional Government of its significance. A study which has been
joined by many of its kind can no longer stand out in isolation. Smith
continued to learn, to inquire, and to grow. But there was one of him
and mnany students of his subject. He was in advance of his contempo-
raries; but academic generations come with startling rapidity, and the
youngsters always have the advantage of fuller knowledge and larger
understanding. It was Smith's tragic fate-at least for formal appreci-
ation-to be too early with his first book and too late with the second.
But it is the exceptional scholar who has the rare fortune to see his
pioneer effort outdone by the students who come after him.0
New Haven, Conn. WALTON H. HAIULTO'N.
Legislative Principles. By Robert Luce. Boston, Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1930. pp. vi, 665. $6.
Legislative Principles is the third of a series of volumes on the legislature
which are the result not only of the author's wide reading but of his long
experience in the lawmaking bodies of the state of Massachusetts and of the
United States. ir. Luce is at his best when he is giving the results of his
own experience based on what he has helped to do and what he has seen
done in the legislative assemblies of which he has been a member. Critical
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estimates of the legislative process and of suggestions for its reform are
peculiarly valuable coming from an'experienced and thoughtful legislator
who knows not only what is contained in the Congressional Record and
committee reports, but also what went on off the record. For this reason
he is a competent judge not only of the surface indications, but also of the
deeper currents which influence the law making process.
Whether the reader agrees or not with the expression of Mr. Luce's
opinions, and there are many cattered throughout the book, he is bound
to take them into account. Mr. Luce prefers the nomination of candidates
by the direct primary to the old method of the party convention. He
believes that it gives a better opportunity to the candidate whose interest
is public service than did the old system of the convention. Interesting also
is his refusal to become disturbed over the circumstance that so many quali-
fied electors stay away from the polls--not "getting out the vote," but getting
into the minds of the people information which will interest them in voting,
is what will count. "The really important thing is not that men should
express opinions, but that they should have opinions to express .... Do
not worry about the absence [from the polls] of the uninformed" (p. 214).
The perplexing problem of discovering dominant public opinion in his
own district on a particular question has led the author to believe that
direct means of ascertaining it, as a post card vote, are unsatisfactory be-
cause of the same lack of definite individual opinion; the legislator must
turn "nowhere and yet everywhere" to discover the public opinion with
which he must be in harmony if he is not to be supplanted (pp. 557-60).
Perhaps the answer is indicated by the author's remark that public opinion
must be "tracked ... from the public to a group of the public" in respect
to each question which comes up in the course of a session, that one's
success as a legislator is measured by the extent to which he has contented
the more active members of his constituency, rather than the degree to
which he has accomplished the impossible task of satisfying that composite
of groups, general, public opinion. The initiative and referendum, with all
of their faults, may be a means of developing informed public opinion
(p. 585), though as a device for securing good laws, the author is none too
sanguine.
Yet it is encouraging to have the author affirm that legislatures have not
deteriorated where the initiative and referendum have been introduced.
From his limited observation the reviewer agrees, and he furthermore
shares the author's optimism in looking ultimately for good from the clash
of interests before the people (p. 633). Nevertheless, he likewise firmly
believes that, so far as Anglo-Saxon society is concerned, "for the great
mass of legislation, nothing better has ever been devised or is today sug-
gested, than the representative assembly" (p. 632). This consideration
makes it the more important that it should be studied and understood, so
that the public may prefer that its many ills be prescribed for by ex-
perienced political physicians rather than'by quacks.
The author goes beyond the study of the legislative process in his first
two chapters and ventures a definition of law: "Law is that which system-
atically impels conduct" (p. 3). He quotes a number of other definitions of
law, but in the end leaves on the mind of the reviewer the confirmation
of his belief that it is the part of a political scientist to examine how law
is created and how it works, rather than to attempt first to define what he
is about to study and then perforce devote most of his attention to describ-
ing a process without any great regard to his definition. It is very evident
that the ancient maxim "ubi societas ibi jus" has been true since organized
society existed, and to the reviewer seems to explain the reason of law, if
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not to define it. The problem of the political scientist would seem to be
rather to describe the content at different historical periods of the notion of
right or law and the process by which that right or law is arrived at.
Furthermore, the process of fixing the rules which are necessary for the
existence of an organized society changes with the social need of different
historical periods and different countries. It is also complicated by the
need for an administrative machinery which may seem of greater impor-
tance in any particular epoch and country than the lawmaking side of
government This the author perceives, apparently, in respect to the rise
of the monarchy in Europe (p. 30), but in the opinion of the reviewer he
has not appreciated the importance of the monarchy, in a country like
France, as a law-making institution regulating old-fashioned social customs
and adjusting the law to meet the changing conditions of society. The great
legislative achievements of the King's Council in France, notably under
Louis XIV, are in striking contrast to the product of the British law-
making machinery of Parliament and King when we compare it either in
form or in content during the seventeenth century with that turned out by
the French lawmaking organ.
An historical point of view which this book does not evidence seems to
the reviewer essential in any consideration of such legal ideas as the
theory of the unitary monarchy or the later notion of the social contract.
They were great forces in their time for breaking down an old order of
society and justifying a new. They were motive ideas rather than phil-
osophic conceptions and are to be estimated for their effectiveness in history
rather than as expressing lasting principles of political science. Perhaps
their present status may warn us against a too confident assertion of the
ultimate validity of present day principles of politics.
New York City. JosEPH P. CHAZBE-RLU .
Economic Aspects of Sovereignty. By R. G. Hawtrey. New
York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1930. pp. v, 162. $2.75.
THIs volume embodies a course of lectures delivered at the Lowell Institute
in 1929 by the author, who is an English economist of high reputation. The
title is somewhat misleading, including as it does that most controversial
term, "sovereignty." Not sovereignty, a problematical attribute of the
state, but the state itself, or political authority, is the subject of discussion.
That politics and economics are inextricably fused in our contemporary
civilization is too apparent to require argument. But in what form, with
what implications, to what ends this fusion takes place are questions well
deserving of investigation. "We are accustomed," says the author, "to
think of economic ends in terms of welfare, but in matters of public policy
that is never the whole story. To each country power appears as the in-
dispensable means to every end. It comes to be exalted into an end itself."
This is the central theme of the book. If states were actuated solely by the
purpose of broadening and enriching the welfare of their peoples, co-opera-
tion and mutual- assistance would commend themselves as natural and obvi-
ous policies; but the maintenance and achievement of power as an end
of national policy inevitably involves conflict, the logical issue of which
is war. Potential war necessitates a continuing emphasis on military force.
The abolition of war is impossible so long as there exists the present
condition of "international anarchy," which rests upon the accepted doctrine
and practice of state sovereignty, and the universal policy of "economic
nationalism." International disputes which are justiciable may readily
enough be arbitrated, or adjudicated by a world court. But the contro-
versies which produce war in our modern civilization are non-justiciable.
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They do not relate to the interpretation and application of accepted princi-
ples of law, but rather reflect tfie antagonistic demands of rival powers
with respect to the exploitation of the natural resources and the control
of the economic development of areas whose populations are unable to
control their own destiny. Nor can the principle of the sovereignty, inde-
pendence and equality of states, which is the foundation postulate of the
classical- system of international law, afford a basis of settlement for inter-
national differences in a rapidly changing and dynamic world. War is
at least an instrument for effecting the necessary adjustments between
political authority and economic power. Its function is essentially legisla-
tive, not judicial. It substitutes a legal status which accords with the
actuality of economic power for a legal status that has become obsolete in
this respect. It is, therefore, an instrument of growth. No purely arbitral
or judicial agency can take its place. But can we hope to develop inter-
national legislative instruments, which may be capable of making the
adjustments in political authority which are required by a changing eco-
nomic order? Such institutions, to be effective, must rest upon a world
public opinion, an international consciousness, sufficiently strong to over-
come the "economic nationalism" which constitutes today the psychological
basis of politics.
In his discussion of such aspects of the problem as foreign trade, tariff
systems, foreign investments, the international financial structure, discrep-
ant standards of living, the industrialization of backward countries, and
the like, Professor Hawtrey employs very effectively the tools of economic
analysis. The work is an important study of the interplay of the economic
and psychological factors in the conflicts of diplomacy and war.
Columbus, Ohio. WALTER JAMES SHEPARD.
Parliament and the British Empire: Some Constitut'ional Can-
troversies Concerning Imperial Legislative Jurisdiction. By
Robert Livingston Schuyler. New York, Columbia University
Press, 1929. pp. vi, 279. $3.75.
ScHoLARs in English constitutional history will find an able answer to
Mr. MclIlwain's challenging book, The American Revolution, in Mr. Schuy-
ler's Parliament and the British Empire. In spite of this title, the theme
of the book is obviously the constitutional conflict of the American Revolu-
tion, the apple of discord between these two historians, although Mr.
Schuyler has tried to remove the core by stating at the outset that he is
not treating the question of Parliament's Jurisdiction over the colonies in
the period immediately preceding the American Revolution. The book
contains five essays dealing with the origin, precedents and later develop-
ment of the imperial power of Parliament, omitting practically the whole
of the eighteenth century except the Irish aspect. The first and the last
essays give the reader Mr. Schuyler's thesis of the full sweep of parlia-
mentary imperial authority from earliest times to the present British
Empire with its Commonwealth of Nations. The second relates the history
of the Irish claim to legislative independence and Parliament's surrender
of jurisdiction in 1783. The third and fourth discuss two conflicts in which
parliamentary control was called in question, one in Barbados, 1650-1652,
and the other in the West Indies intermittently between 1815 and 1875.
These last two scarcely seem relevant enough to include in the collection,
since the one is concerned with action of the Commonwealth Parliament
and the other with the abolition of the island assemblies as a result, not of
a constitutional issue, but of the social revolution following the abolition
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of slavery. The grouping of essays of such different scope and varying
significance spoils the unity which a chronological treatment of the central
theme would have given, and progressively dulls the reader's interest,
quickened at the outset to a high pitch by the vigorous and spirited
character of the first essay.
This first essay, entitled "A Retrospect and a Theory," is the most
significant one in the collection. Its chief aim is to answer Mr. BIcIlwain's
thesis that the American colonies were right in denying Parliament's
jurisdiction over them, that Parliament never possessed lawful authority
outside the realm of England, but that its imperial supremacy originated
in a usurpation begun by the Long Parliament in its act of May 19, 1649.
Mr. Schuyler contends that Parliament has maintained the principle of its
imperial legislative power since long before the colonies were founded, and
in practice has exercised it, though periodically disputes have arisen in
the empire which have laid the matter open to question. He cites in
support many Tudor statutes applying to Wales, Calais, the Channel
Islands, and Mlan, as well as statutes mentioning the dominions in general.
Pushing the study back further into the early history in search of a time
when its jurisdiction was confined to the realm, he follows the relations of
England with Ireland to prove that the power of Parliament was never
confined to the realm, but from earliest times it was imperial in scope.
He concludes that the origin of this authority is not to be explained by
any theory of usurpation, but by the original character of Parliament,
which was merely a session of the royal council--"the king in his council
in his parliaments." The scope of Mr. McIlwain's subject extends from
the act of 1649 through the Revolution of 1688-1689 and eighteenth century
colonial apathy down to the rise of the revolutionary spirit after 1763 and
the crisis of 1774-1776. It is to be regretted that ir. Schuyler did not
see fit to go into this phase of the subject, for it is not easy to accept Mr.
Mcllwain's point of view concerning colonial interpretation of the signifi-
cance of the Revolution of 1688-1689, particularly when his chief evidence
cited is not contemporary colonial opinion, but the opinion of the rival
parties of the seventeen-seventies in America.
Mr. Schuyler has built up a most convincing case concerning the imperial
legislative power of Parliament, but since so much of the evidence can be
interpreted in different ways and precedents made to serve both sides,
since definition of terms such as realm, dominions, etc. and the nature of
the statutes, acts and ordinances likewise vary at different periods, and
since the great mass of judicial decisions, e-xpert opinions and public
points of view (these last for the most part omitted in this study) are
often contradictory, it would seem impossible to determine with certainty
the continuous thread of constitutional development of parliamentary im-
perial power. The futility of attempting final proof, however, does not
detract from the value and interest of controversial stpdies of such in-
-disputable merit as Parliamint a-nd the British Empire, whose careful
scholarship and clear masterful style make it one of the outstanding
historical publications of the year.
London, England. VIora F. BARNES.
Die vd1kerrechtliche Stellung Irliands. By Michael Rynne. Mlu-
nich, Dunker & Humblot, 1930. pp. xii, 435. RM23.
THE status of the British Dominions in international law is a topic which
intrigues an increasing number of scholars and whose literature is growing
by leaps and bounds. This is because of, rather than in spite of, the
Balfour Report issued after the Imperial Conference of 1926, which sug-
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gested that the British Empire, "considered as a whole, defies classification
and bears no resemblance to any other political organization which now
exists or las ever yet been tried." Are the Dominions independent and
fully sovereign states? This is the question most frequently asked and
answered. Among the answers a prominent place should be accorded to
Mr. Rynne's book on the position of Ireland in international law.
The book is divided into three main chapters. The introductory chapter
consists of a cursory survey of Ireland's history from the earliest times to
1921. The second chapter, constituting the bulk of the book, is a compre-
hensive study of the treaty-making power of the Dominions and their
participation in the foreign affairs of the Empire. In the third chapter
the author discusses the activities of the Dominions and of Ireland in the
League of Nations. Mr. Rynne's conclusions are that Ireland is a sovereign
state which has conferred this sovereignty by its own free will and through
an international treaty on a prince who happens to be the ruler of five
other states; that Ireland, through this prince and in accordance with the
Irish Constitution, can perform every act recognized by the law of nations;
and that Ireland is a recognized member of the community of nations and
of the League of Nations and as such is entitled to all rights and bound
by all obligations resulting therefrom (p. 358).
As a whole, Mr. Rynne's book is the result of careful, meticulous study
and evidences a high scholarship. One of its most commendable features
is that information it contains was collected almost exclusively from original
sources: from British and Irish Parliamentary papers, statutes, inter-
national treaties, official publications of the League of Nations and court
decisions. The references and annotations reveal amazingly rich and
voluminous material and it is evident that the author has spared neither
time nor effort to study and analyze this material with the utmost care
and minuteness as well as with critical discretion. His approach to the
problem, whether from the constitutional or international aspect, is strictly
legal and analytical. Students of the British Empire will find especially
valuable the detailed exposition of the struggle through which the Domin-
ions gradually acquired the powers they possess today, while the survey
of the Dominions' and Ireland's activities in the League of Nations is a
most complete collection of data on this point.
Patriotism, however, seems sometimes to have influenced the otherwise
detached and unbiased judgment of the author. This is not surprising,
since he is an Irishman. Mr. Rynne apparently regards the revolutionary
government of the Irish Republic of 1919-1921 as a do facto government
and the present Irish Free State as the successor of that Republic (See
especially pp. 61, 67). Whether that may be correct as far as the relations
of Ireland and Great Britain are concerned is without interest here. From
the point of view of international law, however, it seems that Justice
Peters' opinion in the case of the Irish Free State v. Guaranty Safe Deposit
Co. (129 Misc. 551, 222 N. Y. Supp. 182 (Sup. Ct. 1927)) states correctly
the circumstances under which a government will be considered de facto,
circumstances which were admittedly not present in Ireland during 1919-
21. A more striking illustration of patriotic influence is, however, the refer-
ence to the rejection by the United States Senate of the Treaty of Versailles
and, consequently, of the Covenant of the League of Nations. He expresses
the opinion that the failure of President Wilson to grant a hearing to the
Irish at the Paris Peace Conference and to lend an ear to the Irish request
for admission to the League alienated the Irish elements in the United
States and, this fact had a considerable influence on the Senate (pp.
315-316). While the population of Irish descent undoubtedly has great
influence in certain parts of the United States, such an assertion as that
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of Mr. Rynne is a gross exaggeration, and leaves out of account the many
other significant issues and powerful influences which unquestionably con-
tributed to the repudiation of the Versailles Treaty.
Apart from such slips, Mr. Rynne has made a valuable contribution and
his book can indeed be warmly recommended to every student of inter-
national law, international relations, and history. The practical value of
his conclusions, even if they be correct, can only be tested fully by experi-
ence. Ireland and the Dominions have exercised to a greater or less extent
some attributes of sovereignty, such as the treaty-making power and the
right of legation. They have availed themselves of rights and assumed
obligations as members of the League of Nations. But the exercise of
other powers inherent in every sovereign state such as the power to declare
war or remain neutral, independently of or even contrary to the action of
Great Britain, cannot be stated in the affirmative or negative with absolute
certainty. Assuming that Great Britain would consider Ireland or any
of the Dominions as fully independent and sovereign states, bound
together only in the person of a common ruler, and concede that the
Dominions might declare war while Great Britain is at peace, or that
they might remain neutral while she is involved in armed conflict, it
remains to be seen whether the other powers of the world will accept
such a situation and consider, for instance, the Dominions as neutral powers
in a war they conduct against Great Britain, a possibility the outcome of
which is very doubtful even in Mr. Rynne's mind (pp. 255-25G). There
can be no doubt that the classic definition of a "sovereign state" can no
longer be applied indiscriminately to each and every unit of the community
of nations. In the course of recent developments, new forms of state
organizations have come into existence which cannot as yet be explained by
the theoretical and scientific terms heretofore used. For many practical
purposes Ireland and the British Dominions can be regarded as states
possessing full sovereignty, but it does not necessarily follow that they
should be regarded as fully sovereign for all purposes.
In the reviewer's opinion the most valuable feature of Mr. Rynne's book
is the inevitable conclusion of his fine juristic speculation, namely, that in
spite of all struggle, prejudice, jealousy and self-assertion, the tendency
within the British Commonwealth parallels the tendency in the organized
community of nations, to accept the principle of co-operation instead of
subordination in the relations of nations and states with each other.
New York City. FRANCIS DEAR.
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